3. Insufficient Predictive and Normative Insight
Existing work largely explains what happens but offers limited predictive capacity regarding when and under what conditions vote buying escalates into broader democratic degradation.
A formal, integrative model could also provide normative guidance, indicating strategies to mitigate degradation, such as thresholds of accountability, transparency, or civic education.
This paper addresses these gaps by proposing a multi-level psycho-sociological model---the Transactional Degradation of Democracy (TDD) theory---that integrates five classical frameworks: social exchange, labeling, cognitive dissonance, alienation, and symbolic domination. By translating these interactions into formal mathematical expressions, deriving dynamic equations, and conducting numerical simulations, TDD allows both explanatory and predictive analysis of democratic stability in contexts where electoral transactions are normalized.
II. Literature Review
A. Social Exchange Theory (Homans, Blau)
At the core of human interaction lies a deceptively simple logic: people give, and they expect something in return. This principle, articulated in the seminal works of Homans (1958) and Blau (1964), forms the backbone of social exchange theory. According to this perspective, social behavior is fundamentally transactional. Individuals assess costs and benefits, consciously or subconsciously, in every interaction, seeking to maximize personal gain while minimizing losses.
In the context of electoral politics, social exchange theory offers a powerful lens to understand the pervasive phenomenon of vote buying. Citizens in regions where politicians routinely offer monetary incentives perceive their participation not merely as a civic duty but as a strategic investment. A single vote, like a small commodity, is weighed against immediate material rewards---cash, goods, or favors. The calculus is clear: when political promises are historically unreliable, the expected benefit of holding politicians accountable becomes uncertain, while the tangible reward of an immediate exchange is guaranteed.
On the other side of the transaction, politicians also operate within this exchange logic. Campaign resources are allocated as investments with expected returns. Each rupiah spent to secure votes is evaluated against the anticipated control over legislative decisions, budget allocations, or political influence. In essence, the electoral process is reframed as a market where legitimacy is bought and sold, rather than earned through merit or representation.
Social exchange theory thus illuminates a critical dynamic: it transforms the citizen-legislator relationship. Trust, accountability, and the normative ideals of democracy give way to calculative, transactional logic. This transformation, while individually rational, sets the stage for broader systemic consequences, as repeated transactional interactions erode the moral and political foundation upon which democratic institutions rely.
Empirical studies in Indonesia support this perspective. Research by Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016) documents widespread instances where citizens explicitly rationalize accepting monetary incentives during elections, citing repeated failures of politicians to fulfill promises. Here, social exchange theory does not merely explain isolated behaviors; it captures the structural normalization of transactional politics, linking micro-level decisions to macro-level degradation of democratic legitimacy.
B. Labeling Theory (Becker)
