F = systemic structural impact, including symbolic domination and institutional response
This structure provides a conceptual bridge to formal mathematical modeling, allowing the simulation of democratic stability trajectories under varying conditions of transactional engagement.
C. Hypotheses Linking Voter Rationalization, Legislative Behavior, and System Outcomes
Based on the multi-level causal structure of the Transactional Degradation of Democracy (TDD) framework, this study proposes a set of interrelated hypotheses that describe the dynamic interactions between individual rationalizations, legislative behavior, and systemic political outcomes. These hypotheses are derived from the integration of social exchange, labeling, cognitive dissonance, alienation, and symbolic domination theories, and provide a basis for formal mathematical modeling and empirical testing.
Hypothesis 1: Voter Rationalization and Transactional Compliance
Citizens are more likely to rationalize accepting monetary incentives when the perceived probability of legislative accountability is low and past experience indicates repeated failures of politicians to fulfill promises.
Formally, voter rationalization () is positively correlated with the ratio of monetary incentive () to perceived justice ():
A_r = f\left(\frac{U}{J}\right), \quad \frac{\partial A_r}{\partial U} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial A_r}{\partial J} < 0
Implication: Higher monetary incentives or lower perceived justice increase transactional voting, reinforcing the normalization of vote buying.
Hypothesis 2: Legislative Behavior and Rationalized Compliance
Legislators adjust their behavior based on voter compliance with transactional norms. The greater the perceived willingness of voters to accept incentives, the more legislators rationalize neglecting campaign promises or engaging in arrogance.
