Parameters were tested against historical electoral outcomes and survey-based measures of political trust.
Simulation results align qualitatively with observed patterns of vote buying prevalence, legislative non-compliance, and periodic social unrest in Indonesia, confirming plausibility and predictive relevance.
This empirically grounded parameterization allows subsequent numerical simulations (as described in Section IV.D) to realistically capture the dynamics of transactional politics and democratic degradation in the Indonesian context.
B. Simulation Scenarios: Varying U/JU/JU/J Ratios and Their Effect on Systemic Outcomes
To explore the sensitivity of the Transactional Degradation of Democracy (TDD) framework to the relative magnitudes of monetary incentives (UUU) and perceived justice (JJJ), we conducted a series of simulations varying the U/JU/JU/J ratio across plausible ranges observed in Indonesia. The goal is to examine how changes in incentives relative to justice perception influence micro-, meso-, and macro-level dynamics and ultimately determine system stability (SSS).
1. Low U/JU/JU/J Ratio (High Justice, Low Incentive)
Parameters: U=0.2,J=0.8U = 0.2, J = 0.8U=0.2,J=0.8
Dynamics Observed:
Voter rationalization (ArA_rAr) remains low (<0.3), reflecting resistance to transactional behavior.
Legislative rationalization (ApA_pAp) is constrained; politicians are compelled to fulfill promises due to civic expectations.
Democratic degradation (DDD) remains moderate (~0.25), indicating relatively intact institutional legitimacy.
System stability (SSS) trends negative (~-0.2), suggesting potential mobilization or civic engagement to reform practices.
Interpretation: Low incentives relative to strong perceptions of justice empower citizens to resist transactional pressures, limiting systemic degradation.
2. Medium U/JU/JU/J Ratio (Balanced Incentives and Justice)
Parameters: U=0.5,J=0.5U = 0.5, J = 0.5U=0.5,J=0.5
Dynamics Observed:
Micro-level variables (Ar,ApA_r, A_pAr,Ap) fluctuate due to competing forces of material incentives and perceived justice.
Meso-level social norms (SmesoS_\text{meso}Smeso) amplify small deviations, producing oscillatory dynamics in democratic degradation (D0.40.6D \approx 0.4-0.6D0.40.6).
System stability (SSS) hovers near zero, marking a critical bifurcation region where small changes in UUU or JJJ can shift the system toward authoritarianism or unrest.
Interpretation: The system is highly sensitive; feedback loops magnify minor shifts, highlighting the importance of controlling incentives and reinforcing justice perception to prevent tipping points.
3. High U/JU/JU/J Ratio (High Incentive, Low Justice)
Parameters: U=0.8,J=0.2U = 0.8, J = 0.2U=0.8,J=0.2
Dynamics Observed:
Voter rationalization (ArA_rAr) quickly rises toward 0.9, reflecting high transactional compliance.
Legislative rationalization (ApA_pAp) escalates, enabling politicians to ignore promises and act arrogantly.
Democratic degradation (DDD) approaches 0.85, indicating severe erosion of institutional legitimacy.
System stability (SSS) remains positive (~0.3), signaling drift toward authoritarian consolidation with passive compliance.
Interpretation: When material incentives overwhelm perceptions of justice, the political system becomes dominated by entrenched transactional dynamics, reducing accountability and democratic responsiveness.