B3: Direct Coercion
KKP\mathcal{K} \xrightarrow{-\gamma_{\mathcal{K}}} P.
Short-run suppression of unrest; stabilizing only if trust costs are contained.
B4: Economic Normalization
UUEPU \xrightarrow{-\phi_U} E \xrightarrow{-} P; and baseline dissipation EEE \xrightarrow{-\mu_E} \emptyset.
Relief and time help stresses decay.
3) Policy interaction and the bifurcation lever
Policy responsiveness creates a meta-loop governed by the ratio
rKU.r \equiv \frac{\rho_{\mathcal{K}}}{\rho_U}.
Low rr (fast relief, cautious coercion): B2 dominates R-loops high-TT attractor.
High rr (fast coercion, slow relief): R2+R4 dominate low-TT, persistent PP attractor.
 Varying rr shifts the system across a saddle-node or Hopf bifurcation depending on other elasticities (e.g., ,E,K,K\kappa,\theta_E,\gamma_{\mathcal{K}},\eta_{\mathcal{K}}).
4) Delay, saturation, and thresholds
Delays: fiscal rollout lags for UU, and perception lags for TT, can create oscillations (Hopf) if feedbacks over-correct.
Saturation: tanh()\tanh(\cdot) caps U,KU,\mathcal{K}; near capacity, marginal policy is less effective, raising the chance of tipping.
Thresholds: SE(E;E,)S_E(E;\theta_E,\kappa) steepens conversion of stress to unrest near E\theta_E; large \kappa makes the system more brittle.
5) Sign structure of the Jacobian (qualitative)
