c. Time Frame:
Simulations proceed over T=100T = 100 sessions (interpreted as negotiation rounds or annual summits).
Outcomes and trust memory feed into future sessions via zone transition functions.
3. Behavioral Rules
Each agent:
Prioritizes negotiation items based on a weighted interest vector:
In={E,P,S}\vec{I}_n = \{\alpha_E, \alpha_P, \alpha_S\}
representing Economic, Political, Strategic long-term goals.
Assesses zone configurations with other agents to determine flexibility or rigidity in offers.
May signal ambiguity, shift zones, or form temporary alliances to change leverage.
Updates relational value functions using:
Rij(t+1)=f(Rij(t),behaviorij(t),zone_shiftij)R_{ij}(t+1) = f(R_{ij}(t), \text{behavior}_{ij}(t), text{zone\_shift}_{ij})
with optional stochastic perturbations (e.g., shocks, media framing, domestic political shifts).
4. Key Metrics Captured
Negotiation convergence rate across zones.
Zone volatility per dyad and multilateral group.
Effect of long-term vision (Jernih agents) on overall system stability.
Betrayal cost multiplier: Impact of zone regression (Green Black) on future cooperation potential.
Coalition fluidity index: How often and how fast agents shift strategic alliances.
5. Selected Findings (Illustrative)
Negotiations that begin in the Yellow zone (strategic ambiguity) tend to diverge unless one or more agents exhibit high Jernih score (long-term transparency and vision).
Black-zone entry by one agent (e.g., unilateral policy betrayal) significantly increases total negotiation rounds and decreases collective payoff, even for the betrayer.
Red-zone negotiations can still reach resolution if surrounded by Green-zone dyads, acting as buffers and trust bridges.
Jernih actors, though slower in immediate gain, shape stable long-term coalitions and often emerge as system anchors.
Transnational institutions with low coercion but high visibility improve trust dynamics by stabilizing zone memory functions, reducing erratic behavior.
6. Theoretical Implications
This simulation demonstrates that relational climate---not just material payoff---is a fundamental axis in multinational negotiation outcomes. The RZE framework suggests:
Zone awareness and transitions should be part of diplomatic training and negotiation models.
Negotiation failure is often rooted not in payoff disagreement but in zone misalignment and ambiguous intent.
Institutions like WTO, IMF, or UNFCC could optimize their roles not merely as rule enforcers but as relational memory custodians or zone stabilizers.
7. Broader Applications
Trade blocs like ASEAN, EU, or AU can use RZE modeling to analyze internal cohesion and zone drift.
Debt restructuring dialogues (e.g., Global South with Paris Club/China) can incorporate relational variables beyond debt-to-GDP ratios.
Climate finance and loss-damage negotiations can be simulated with agent values weighted on future vision (Jernih zone) to explore trust-building paths.
C. Strategic Trade Conflict in Multi-Zone Dynamics
1. Rationale
