This section outlines the conceptual foundations and limitations of the three most influential models in modern moral philosophy, Rawls' justice theory, Habermas' communicative ethics, and Kohlberg's moral development theory, while establishing the conceptual space in which the Setiawan Hierarchy introduces a critical intervention.
2.1 John Rawls and the Limits of Ideal Justice
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971) revolutionized political ethics by proposing a model of justice as fairness, structured through the original position and the veil of ignorance. His emphasis on procedural justice, rational autonomy, and impartiality has become a normative ideal for liberal democracies.
However, critiques, such as those from Amartya Sen, Charles Mills, and non-Western scholars, have noted that Rawls' model suffers from excessive idealization, often abstracted from real-world inequalities, historical injustices, and cultural pluralism. It tends to suppress the power relations and hegemonies that predefine access to justice itself. Moreover, the Rawlsian framework is largely silent on the moral agency of non-liberal traditions or spiritual dimensions of justice.
2.2 Jrgen Habermas and the Boundaries of Rational Discourse
Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action (1981) advances moral reasoning through intersubjective communication. His idea of the ideal speech situation assumes that undistorted dialogue can lead to normatively valid agreements, laying the foundation for democratic legitimacy.
While offering a dialogical alternative to Rawls' individualistic model, Habermas has been criticized for overestimating the neutrality and universality of rational communication. In real-world settings, discursive power imbalances, media manipulation, and structural exclusions often prevent genuine consensus. Critics like Nancy Fraser and Chantal Mouffe have pointed out that his model marginalizes emotional, cultural, and spiritual registers of moral life, favoring a technocratic rationalism over agonistic pluralism.
2.3 Lawrence Kohlberg and the Linear Bias of Developmental Ethics
Kohlberg's model of moral development (1958) outlines six stages grouped into three levels: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional morality. Influenced by Piagetian cognitive development, Kohlberg claims that individuals progress through increasingly abstract forms of moral reasoning, culminating in principles of justice.
However, empirical studies by Carol Gilligan and others have revealed gender, cultural, and epistemological biases in Kohlberg's schema. The assumption that abstract justice is the pinnacle of moral maturity marginalizes care ethics, communal values, and transcendent moral commitments. Moreover, the model presupposes a Western liberal trajectory that fails to explain the enduring influence of tradition, charisma, or spiritual ethics in many societies.
2.4 Existing Alternatives and Gaps
