By recontextualizing rationality as relational, RZE opens space for:
Ethical economics where trust, vision, and dignity are strategic values.
Moral ambiguity as part of calculative frameworks, not as noise.
Cross-cultural interpretations of rational action (e.g., relational harmony in East Asia vs. adversarial competition in Western models).
It also provides a pathway to decolonize economic rationality by incorporating non-Western modes of understanding relational interdependence, collective decision-making, and temporality.
Conclusion
The RZE framework reframes rationality not as a narrow, linear, individual payoff maximization, but as a zone-sensitive, temporally informed, and relationally intelligent process. This paradigmatic shift aligns more closely with observed human and institutional behaviors and offers a more realistic foundation for both micro- and macro-economic modeling in an increasingly entangled world.
B. Expanding the Payoff Structure: Integrating Intention, Ambiguity, and Adaptation
Traditional economic models, particularly within game theory and neoclassical frameworks, model payoff as a function of actions and outcomes---largely in deterministic or probabilistically bounded terms. However, Relational Zone Economics (RZE) proposes a paradigm shift by introducing three additional but fundamental variables into the payoff architecture:
Intention (I)
Ambiguity (A)
Adaptation ()
These variables reflect deeper relational and temporal dynamics that are often invisible in classical models but deeply influential in real-world decision-making.
1. Intention (I): Signaling Future Trajectory
In RZE, intention is not merely a psychological state but an observable (though not always quantifiable) parameter derived from:
Patterned behavior over time
Strategic signals or silence
Reputation and public statements
Structural commitment (e.g., long-term contracts or shared risk)
We define intention not as a static trait but as a relational function:
Iij(t)=f(historical alignment,structural investments,credible signaling)I_{ij}(t) = f(\text{historical alignment}, \text{structural investments}, \text{credible signaling})
