Relational Zone Economics: Toward a Complex Adaptive Theory of Strategic Human Interaction in Economic Systems
Abstract
Most classical and modern economic theories---including those recognized with Nobel Prizes---are fundamentally built upon assumptions of bounded rationality, utility-maximizing behavior, and interaction models dominated by reactive and repeated strategic choices. However, empirical socio-economic realities are often far more complex, nuanced, and relational than what can be captured by traditional stimulus-response paradigms or payoff-based formulations.
This paper introduces a novel theoretical framework---Relational Zone Economics (RZE)---which reconceptualizes economic interaction as a dynamic, multi-dimensional process shaped not only by payoffs but also by relational positioning. The model incorporates six relational zones (White, Green, Yellow, Red, Black, and Clear), each representing distinct modes of socio-economic interaction, from neutral cooperation to betrayal or visionary alignment.
RZE enriches economic modeling by embedding strategic intention, relational memory, ambiguity, and long-term interest within an adaptive complex systems framework. We propose a formal evaluation function Rij(t)R_{ij}(t), representing dynamic relational value between agents over time, and demonstrate its integration with game-theoretic structures and temporal adaptation dynamics. This allows agents to act not merely on current incentives, but also on projected risks, relational trajectories, and reputation-based forecasts.
Through agent-based simulations and early-stage empirical applications, we show that RZE outperforms conventional rational models in explaining phenomena such as trust emergence, strategic collaboration, and the evolution of economic conflict. This framework offers a significant step toward a more relational, adaptive, and systemically grounded economic theory.
Theoretical and Empirical Background
1. Limitations of Nobel-Winning Economic Theories
While Nobel Prize-winning contributions in economics have significantly advanced our understanding of strategic behavior, decision-making, and institutional design, they remain limited in capturing the relational, adaptive, and psychologically ambiguous dimensions of real-world economic interactions. These limitations become particularly evident when economic behavior unfolds in uncertain, emotionally charged, or temporally evolving contexts---areas where human interactions are governed not merely by calculable payoffs, but by the dynamic evolution of trust, perceived intentions, and memory-based relational framing.
Below, we examine some of the most influential Nobel-recognized contributions in economic theory and identify the critical gaps that motivate the development of our Relational Zone Economics (RZE) framework.
A. John Nash (Nash Equilibrium) --- Strategic Rationality in Static Environments
