A recurring pattern emerges from post-election surveys and media accounts: many voters rationalize accepting monetary incentives offered during campaigns, justifying this behavior with the belief that promises made by politicians are unlikely to be fulfilled. From the perspective of the electorate, the transaction of vote for immediate material gain becomes more certain than awaiting uncertain policy outcomes. This phenomenon, commonly referred to as vote buying, transforms the citizen-representative relationship from one based on trust and accountability into a transactional exchange.
Such transactional interactions have far-reaching consequences. Beyond the immediate ethical and moral concerns, they contribute to a systemic degradation of democratic legitimacy. Legislators perceive that electoral support has been "purchased," which can embolden arrogance and reduce responsiveness. Simultaneously, citizens' repeated engagement in transactional voting reinforces the normalization of this practice, weakening collective political efficacy and fostering alienation from democratic processes.
This dual process---where both citizens and politicians adjust their behaviors to rationalize transactional interactions---creates a feedback loop. The more votes are bought and normalized, the more politicians feel justified in disregarding the electorate, and the more citizens feel compelled to treat elections as opportunities for material gain. The resulting dynamic is a critical driver of political instability, manifesting in periodic unrest, public protests, and erosion of civic norms across regions.
Against this backdrop, Indonesia provides a compelling case for examining how psychological rationalizations and social dynamics interact to produce systemic degradation in a democratic context. The persistence of vote buying and legislative arrogance not only threatens immediate political stability but also serves as a lens to understand the conditions under which democracies may drift toward authoritarianism or anarchy, depending on the interplay between material incentives and perceived justice.
B. Literature Gap: Need for an Integrative, Formalized Model
Extant scholarship on electoral behavior, vote buying, and democratic erosion has made significant contributions in understanding political transactions and clientelism. Research in political science and sociology has documented the prevalence of vote buying in emerging democracies, highlighting its impact on electoral outcomes and patterns of political patronage (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016; Hicken, 2011; Schaffer, 2007). Psychological studies have further explored how cognitive biases, rationalizations, and identity labeling influence voter and politician behavior (Festinger, 1957; Becker, 1963).
However, several critical gaps remain in the literature:
1. Fragmented Theoretical Approaches
Most studies address one or two theoretical dimensions in isolation. For example, clientelism research often focuses on structural and economic mechanisms, while cognitive dissonance and labeling are primarily examined in micro-level psychological studies.
Rarely have these theories been integrated into a multi-level framework that simultaneously accounts for individual psychology, social interaction, and systemic political consequences.
2. Lack of Formalization
While qualitative analyses provide rich descriptions of transactional politics, there is limited effort to translate these insights into mathematical or computational models.
Without formalization, it is difficult to simulate dynamic feedback loops, predict systemic outcomes, or identify critical thresholds that may lead to instability, authoritarian drift, or social anarchy.
