Between Gratitude and Constitutional Abuse: Criticism of Amnesty/Abolition Recipients' Lawsuits Against Judges

Abstract

In today's digital era, where information spreads instantly through social media and mass media, public perceptions of legal and political issues are often shaped by incomplete, unbalanced, or even biased reporting. This is particularly evident in the public discourse surrounding the granting of amnesty and abolition by the President of the Republic of Indonesia---often misunderstood as a correction of judicial decisions. Constitutionally, the President's prerogative lies in the realm of political law, while court rulings remain within the independent judicial sphere. This article takes a deductive and analytical approach to explore the relationship between presidential prerogatives, judicial decisions, and the ethical as well as legal implications for recipients of amnesty or abolition who are after sue judges. Drawing on constitutional law, Pancasila political ethics, and the mystical consciousness of nationhood, it argues that those granted state clemency should show gratitude and respect toward both state institutions involved. Using this privilege as a weapon for personal gain, especially in ways that fuel inter-institutional conflict, constitutes an confrontation with the constitution and a deviation from Pancasila's democratic values. In this context, ensuring factual accuracy in public discourse is vital to prevent misleading narratives and to safeguard harmony among the branches of government.

Keywords: Presidential prerogative; amnesty; abolition; constitution; mystical national consciousness; Pancasila political ethics; abuse of rights; judicial independence; digital media.

Introduction

In the Indonesian constitutional architecture, amnesty and abolition are part of the President's prerogative , explicitly stipulated in Article 14 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD NRI 1945). This article affirms that the President has the authority to grant amnesty and abolition, subject to the consideration of the House of Representatives (DPR). This prerogative is not a judicial instrument intended to overturn or correct court decisions, but rather an executive policy of law aimed at achieving state interests, national reconciliation, or restoring socio-political stability (Asshiddiqie, 2010).

From a theoretical perspective, this authority reflects the principle of checks and balances , where the President ( executive ) has certain instruments to balance the impact of court decisions, but not to negate their legal truth. Philosophically, granting amnesty or abolition places the state in the position of the highest pardoner , similar to the concept of raison d'tat which places national interests above the interests of strict criminal enforcement (Habermas, 1996).

However, a developing phenomenon presents an ethical and legal paradox . Rather than closing the legal dispute, there are cases of amnesty or abolition recipients challenging court decisions, even reporting the judges who ruled on their cases, alleging erroneous decisions, lack of independence, or even "misconduct." These incidents have given rise to serious debate about the meaning, limitations, and ethics of the state's use of the pardon right.

A prominent example is the case of Tom Lembong , who returned to the spotlight after reporting the judge who had handed down a verdict in a sugar import corruption case . This legal action was taken after he obtained an amnesty from the President of the Republic of Indonesia, which legally halted the prosecution of the case. This amnesty was legally based on Emergency Law Number 11 of 1954 concerning Amnesty and Abolition, specifically Article 4, which stipulates that an abolition stops criminal prosecution, while an amnesty removes all legal consequences of a crime.

The question that then arises is: Is a countersuit against a judge after granting an amnesty legally justifiable, or does it actually violate the President's prerogative? Doctrinally, the principle of res judicata pro veritate habetur stipulates that a judge's decision is considered correct until overturned by a higher court through a legitimate legal mechanism (Sudikno Mertokusumo, 2009). This means that an abolition or amnesty never changes the legal fact that the decision was made in accordance with the judicial mechanism.

From the perspective of the theory of abuse of rights , the act of suing a judge after receiving a pardon can be seen as an abuse of legal rights for deviant purposes, namely delegitimizing the judicial institution and destroying harmony between the branches of state power (Ruiter, 2001). Ethically, recipients of amnesty or abolition should show gratitude and respect for the executive branch that grants pardon and the judiciary that carries out its judicial function, not use the pardon as a tool for counterattack.

Furthermore, from the principle of separation of powers , the President and judges have distinct yet complementary domains of authority. Granting an abolition does not necessarily imply judicial error, but rather reflects legitimate executive intervention to end a criminal proceeding for the greater good. Suing a judge under these circumstances has the potential to set a bad precedent, one where the President's prerogative is manipulated as a litigation tool.

Therefore, this article positions the phenomenon of amnesty or abolition recipients' lawsuits against judges as a form of legal error and an abuse of the President's prerogative . Using a deductive-analytical approach, this article outlines the normative, ethical, and constitutional foundations of this phenomenon, while also offering solutions to prevent future abuses of state prerogative.

Absurd and Legally Irrelevant

In legal logic, a lawsuit against a judge after granting amnesty or abolition is a legally absurd step. This directly contradicts the principle of res judicata pro veritate habetur, which states that every judge's decision is considered correct and legally binding until overturned by a higher court through an appeal, cassation, or judicial review mechanism (Mertokusumo, 2009). This principle is the foundation of the stability of the judicial system, because without it, every decision will continue to be challenged endlessly, eroding legal certainty which is one of the pillars of the rule of law ( rechtsstaat ) (Asshiddiqie, 2010).

Amnesty and abolition, as stipulated in Article 14 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and Emergency Law No. 11 of 1954, were never intended to be instruments to justify judges' errors in ruling. Both are legal political policies ( statecraft ) issued by the President for the greater good: national reconciliation, political stability, or the protection of the country's strategic interests (Habermas, 1996). Therefore, suing a judge after receiving a pardon is a fundamental misunderstanding of the function and nature of these two instruments.

Constitutionally, the President's prerogative falls within the executive branch, while judicial decisions fall within the judicial branch. Blurring this line by considering pardons as evidence of judicial error undermines the separation of powers , the foundation of modern democracy (Montesquieu, 1748/1989). This logical confusion not only undermines the President's authority but also undermines the authority of the judiciary.

Furthermore, this phenomenon carries the risk of abuse of rights ---the misuse of legal rights for illegitimate purposes (Ruiter, 2001). In this case, the right to sue is used not to seek justice, but rather to delegitimize the judicial institution and create a public narrative that a legally enforced decision is wrong. Philosophically, state prerogatives---including amnesty and abolition---are forms of forgiveness, not additional ammunition for political or personal warfare.

From a public ethics perspective, a recipient of amnesty or abolition should display an attitude of constitutional gratitude ---respect for the President who granted the pardon and respect for the judge who carried out his duties as mandated by law. Turning a pardon into a springboard for attacking the judge is a denial of the moral meaning of the pardon itself. It's like someone rescued from a storm then cursing the ship that brought them to shore.

This phenomenon also reveals a deeper crisis in our political life: the loss of a mystical sense of nationalism . The nation's founders envisioned the republic not merely as an arena for political competition, but as a spiritual-collective forum that embodies the ideals of independence as a sacred mandate (Notonagoro, 1975). The Pancasila democracy they formulated is one rooted in mutual cooperation, deliberation, and an orientation toward the interests of the nation, rather than individualistic or narrow group interests.

Unfortunately, the current democracy often produces politicians who have lost their connection to national consciousness. Their focus is reduced to mere self-preservation or group interests , ignoring the noble vision of the republic. Within this framework, it's not surprising that state forgiveness, which should be a symbol of wisdom, is instead twisted into a political weapon.

The mystical consciousness of nationalism teaches that personal interests must be subsumed by the interests of the nation. Therefore, recipients of amnesty or abolition, if they still adhere to this consciousness, will view forgiveness as the end of a conflict, not the beginning of a new chapter of counterattack. This is where we need political leadership. who has the soul of a statesman, not just a political player who is adept at exploiting legal loopholes.

The normative solution requires reaffirming in regulations and legal doctrine that recipients of amnesty or abolition cannot use legal instruments to challenge judges' final decisions unless there is clear evidence of ethical or criminal violations. Ethically, political and legal education for public leaders must reinstill national values rooted in Pancasila democracy and the vision of the nation's founders.

In this way, we not only fortify the legal system against abuse of rights, but also restore our political integrity. Without this restoration, the President's prerogative will continue to be vulnerable to abuse, and the judicial system will always be threatened by legally irrelevant lawsuits. Ultimately, what we need is not only legal certainty, but also a collective awareness that this republic is founded on the principle of mutual respect between the branches of government, for the sake of the priceless ideal of independence.

Abuse of the President's Prerogative

In the Indonesian constitutional system, the President's prerogative to grant amnesty and abolition is a manifestation of the principle of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. This right, as stipulated in Article 14 of the 1945 Constitution, is not simply the President's absolute freedom, but rather an authority limited by constitutional mechanisms, namely the consideration of the House of Representatives. It embodies a legal political mandate to safeguard national interests and promote social reconciliation.

However, when a recipient of an amnesty or pardon uses this opportunity to sue the judge who ruled on their case, this action can be interpreted as an abuse of the President's prerogative . This is because, implicitly, the lawsuit creates the public impression that the President's pardon is a form of "justification" for the judge's alleged misconduct. However, constitutionally, the granting of a pardon has absolutely no bearing on the validity or accuracy of the judge's decision.

The President's prerogative operates within the realm of legal policy, viewing cases from the perspective of broader state interests: political stability, national security, or social reconciliation. Meanwhile, judges operate within the realm of judicial law enforcement, bound by evidence, procedures, and positive legal norms (Marzuki, 2017). Conflating these two realms constitutes a conceptual error that has the potential to blur the boundaries between executive and judicial power, thus disrupting the balance of power that is a fundamental principle of constitutional democracy.

If someone believes they are legally innocent , the honorable and logically consistent course of action is to reject the grant of amnesty or pardon and then continue their resistance through the available legal mechanisms---appeal, cassation, or judicial review. In this way, the acquittal or release obtained has full judicial legitimacy, not simply the result of legal political intervention. Conversely, accepting amnesty and then attacking the judge means enjoying the benefits of amnesty while undermining its symbolic meaning.

Such actions can be interpreted as an instrumentalization of mercy ---the use of state pardon policies as a tool for personal ends, rather than for the common good (Dworkin, 1986). Worse still , this step could pit the President against the judiciary in public opinion, creating the perception that executive decisions are tacitly correcting judicial decisions. However, according to Montesquieu's (1748/1989) doctrine of separation of powers, each branch of government has its own legitimacy and should not be used to undermine the other.

The motivation behind such actions is indeed questionable . If the motive is simply "defending one's good name" or "correcting a legal error", then accepting abolition would be a logical contradiction. This is because abolition eliminates the prosecution process and its legal implications without overturning the existing verdict. In legal philosophy terms, this is a performative inconsistency: saying one thing (wanting to clear one's name through the law) while doing the opposite (receiving a political pardon).

From a national ethical perspective, this action violates the mystical values of national consciousness rooted in the spirit of sacrifice and political honesty. The nation's founders designed prerogative not as a political trading instrument, but as a bridge to overcome legal impasses and safeguard the greater national interest. Using it to counterattack judges actually diminishes the nation's dignity .

Within the framework of political responsibility theory, every pardon recipient has a moral responsibility to maintain the integrity of the policy (Thompson, 1987). Making it a tool of confrontation violates the unwritten moral contract between the pardon recipient and the pardoner--- namely, that pardons are given to close wounds, not open new ones.

To prevent a recurrence of similar phenomena, legal norms need to be strengthened, stating that state pardons cannot be used as a basis for challenging a judge's final decision unless there is clear evidence of ethical or criminal violations during the judicial process. This could be incorporated into the revision of Emergency Law No. 11 of 1954 or through constitutional interpretation by the Constitutional Court.

Politically, the President also needs to consider the profile and track record of abolition or amnesty recipients to minimize the risk of abuse. In the tradition of state politics, pardons are ideally granted to those who not only meet the legal requirements but also demonstrate ethical behavior consistent with the goals of the pardon policy itself (Sunstein, 1996).

Ultimately, the president's prerogative is a symbol of state sovereignty that transcends the rigidity of the law for the sake of humanity and national interests. Using it as political ammunition to attack judges reduces this noble symbol to a mere tool for personal maneuvering. At this point, what is at stake is not only the credibility of the judiciary, but also the dignity of the presidential institution.

The philosophical awareness that needs to be revived is that this republic is founded on a relationship of mutual respect between the branches of government. The president, judges, and politicians are all servants of the state, each with their own jurisdiction. Crossing that boundary with destructive intent is a form of political malpractice that erodes the foundations of Pancasila democracy. Therefore, if one's true goal is to defend one's good name, one should do so through sound legal channels, without harming the hand that has granted forgiveness.

Dimensions of Public Ethics

Within a democratic state based on the rule of law, public ethics serves as an unwritten foundation that underpins the relationship between citizens, public officials, and state institutions. Public ethics not only regulates what is and is not legally permissible but also guides the behavior of officials and citizens to align with the nation's noble values. In this context, recipients of amnesty or abolition bear a moral responsibility to respect two essential pillars of the state: the executive, which grants pardons, and the judiciary, which decides cases.

Ethically, legal pardons are a form of state generosity. Recipients are expected not to use the gift as an instrument of confrontation against the institution that previously examined them. Using abolition or amnesty as a springboard to attack judges can be categorized as an abuse of rights , namely the misuse of rights that, in legal principle, contradicts the principle of nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet ---a person may not use their rights beyond the purpose for which they were granted (Friedmann, 1990).

This abuse of power undermines the harmony between the branches of state power. The president exercises his prerogative within the framework of legal politics, while judges exercise their duties based on evidence and legal procedures. When a pardon recipient attacks a judge, it not only undermines the judge's personal integrity but also undermines public trust in the judiciary as a whole. Consequently, the state's authority is eroded from two directions: the executive branch, whose policies are manipulated, and the judiciary, whose decisions are manipulated by public opinion.

This phenomenon demonstrates a characteristic that can be associated with Machiavellian politics. In The Prince, Niccol Machiavelli (1532/1998) describes a strategy of maintaining power by prioritizing extreme pragmatism, even at the expense of traditional morality. Machiavelli argued that a shrewd ruler will exploit every opportunity, even if it compromises ethical relationships with others. In contemporary practice, this attitude is reflected when a politician accepts a pardon for personal gain, then uses it as a political weapon to weaken opponents, including state institutions.

The Machiavellian type of politician is incompatible with Pancasila democracy. The democratic system designed by the nation's founders presupposes a mystical national consciousness, a profound understanding that power is a sacred trust that must be used to realize the ideals of independence, not merely an instrument for the accumulation of personal interests. Pancasila, particularly its fourth principle, places an obligation on leadership to prioritize deliberation and the common good, rather than justifying any means for individual victory.

Ignoring this dimension has the potential to give rise to individualistic and opportunistic politicians. In political philosophy, this is called instrumental rationality ---reason used solely to achieve goals without considering the moral dimension ( ends justify the means ). However, in the Pancasila political ethics paradigm, means and ends must both reflect the values of justice, honesty, and respect for human dignity (Kaelan, 2010).

Furthermore, the abuse of prerogatives through the behavior of pardon recipients can set a bad precedent. In the future, other amnesty or abolition recipients may feel justified in using this policy as a political bargaining chip or moral justification for their actions. This erodes the philosophical meaning of state pardons, which should serve as a bridge to reconciliation, not a weapon of revenge.

From the perspective of John Rawls's (1971) theory of justice, the actions of Machiavellian politicians who exploit state pardons constitute a form of procedural injustice. This is because they gain special advantages from a supposedly neutral system and then use them to discredit other parts of the system. This creates an unfair advantage that contradicts the principle of justice as fairness.

A normative solution to this problem requires two steps. First , establishing a code of ethics for state pardon recipients that prohibits using pardons as grounds for suing judges unless there is clear evidence of legal violations during the judicial process. Second , fostering political education based on a mystical national consciousness , so that politicians understand that power, including the president's prerogative, is part of a moral contract between the state and the people.

From a public ethics perspective, a state pardon is a second chance that carries a moral obligation: the obligation not to harm the party granting it and not to disrupt constitutional harmony. Violating this principle constitutes a form of political moral hazard that threatens the sustainability of Pancasila democracy.

Therefore, recipients of amnesty or abolition should adopt a stance consistent with national values: respecting the President's decision, respecting the judge's ruling, and refraining from maneuvers that pit these two institutions against each other. This awareness, if firmly established, will distinguish between politicians who are merely tactically astute and strategically wise leaders---leaders who understand that political dignity lies in their ability to uphold the nation's honor, not merely in winning battles.

Legal Consequences

In the Indonesian legal system, judges are state officials protected by the principle of judicial immunity. This protection is not a form of absolute immunity that exempts judges from all forms of responsibility, but rather guarantees that judges can decide cases without fear of pressure or intimidation, including the threat of lawsuits from parties dissatisfied with the decision. This immunity is explicitly regulated in Article 16 of Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power, which states that judges cannot be sued either civilly or criminally for decisions they render as long as they are carried out in accordance with the law and their authority.

Conceptually, this protection rests on the principle of judicial independence, a universal principle of the rule of law. This independence not only means freedom from executive and legislative intervention, but also freedom from pressure from parties directly involved in the case. A lawsuit based solely on dissatisfaction with a final decision---especially one that has become legally binding --- will almost certainly be rejected by the court.

Furthermore, if the lawsuit contains elements of defamation or slander against the judge, the lawsuit could become a legal problem for the plaintiff. Articles 310 and 311 of the Criminal Code stipulate that defamation committed in public, including against state officials, is subject to criminal sanctions. In this context, attacking the integrity of a judge with unproven accusations not only undermines the dignity of the judiciary but also sets a bad precedent for judicial independence in deciding cases.

From a legal philosophy perspective, suing a judge after a valid and binding decision violates the principle of res judicata pro veritate habetur, the assumption that a judge's decision is correct until overturned through a legitimate legal mechanism (Marzuki, 2005). This principle maintains the stability of the legal system to prevent infinite regress ---a legal process that continues to repeat itself without end. If every losing party could sue their own judge, legal certainty would collapse, and the judiciary would become an arena for revenge.

The legal consequences of such an attempt could affect two areas simultaneously: first , the failure of the lawsuit due to its violation of the principle of judicial immunity; second, the potential criminalization of the plaintiff if proven to have committed defamation or other unlawful acts. Therefore, strategically, suing a judge simply out of dissatisfaction is a self-defeating action ---one that destroys one's own position.

In the case of pardon recipients, the issue becomes more complex. Pardon is a presidential prerogative granted based on legal and political considerations, not an assessment of judicial error. Ethically, if a person believes they are innocent and fully believe in the correctness of their position, they should firmly refuse pardon from the outset. Such a refusal would demonstrate moral integrity and consistency in their beliefs.

Accepting an abolition implicitly acknowledges the existence of the court's decision, even if you disagree with its substance. Therefore, after accepting an abolition, filing a lawsuit against the judge based on the content of the decision is not only contradictory from a legal standpoint but also undermines the state's authority ---in this case, it undermines the President as the issuer of the abolition and the judicial system as the adjudicator of the case.

From a state ethics perspective, such behavior demonstrates a self-interest orientation that places ego above institutional harmony. However, in Pancasila democracy, personal interests must be subordinated to the greater national interest. Notonagoro (1975) emphasized that Pancasila requires harmony between the interests of individuals, society, and the state within a unified whole.

Social contract theoretical approach is also relevant here: when individuals benefit from state decisions---including abolition---they are morally bound to abide by the social contract that governs the relationship between them and state institutions. Violating this contract by attacking the institutions that have provided benefits is a form of breach of trust that undermines the legitimacy of citizen-state relations.

Furthermore, these legal consequences must also be viewed within the framework of checks and balances . Judges are responsible for monitoring violations of the law, while the President is responsible for political control over the law. Confronting the two through manipulative actions will upset this balance and, in the long term, could erode public trust in all branches of government.

Therefore, a possible solution is to develop derivative regulations governing the ethics of state pardon recipients. These regulations could include a clause prohibiting lawsuits against judges except in exceptional circumstances, such as clear evidence of a violation of the judicial code of ethics. This would safeguard the President's prerogative, and prevent the integrity of the judiciary from being compromised by opportunistic maneuvers .

Such policies align with the principle of constitutional morality (Bickel, 1962), namely the belief that public officials and citizens must prioritize respect for the spirit of the constitution, rather than simply exploiting legal loopholes for personal gain. In the context of Pancasila democracy, this means maintaining the honor of the state as the primary goal of every political and legal action.

If these principles are ignored , the long-term consequence will be the normalization of behavior that undermines the state's authority. Pardon recipients could set a bad precedent for future generations of politicians, where the president's prerogative is viewed as a personal negotiating tool, and judges' decisions are seen as mere opinions that can be challenged at will.

Thus, the legal consequences of suing a judge after receiving an abolition are not limited to the failure of the lawsuit or potential criminal penalties, but also encompass broader damage to the legal and moral order of the country. Ultimately, upholding the honor of state institutions is not merely a legal obligation, but also a moral mandate that must be upheld by every citizen who claims to love this Republic.

Conclusion

In Pancasila democracy, the president's prerogative to grant amnesty or abolition is a manifestation of constitutional wisdom aimed at maintaining national harmony. This authority falls within the realm of legal politics, while judges' decisions fall within the independent judicial realm. These two realms are not meant to be in conflict, but rather to complement each other to uphold substantive justice.

If someone has received abolition or amnesty, the ethical and legal consequences include respect for the two institutions involved: the executive and the judiciary. Accepting a state pardon is a sign that the state has given a second chance, and the appropriate attitude is gratitude, not using it as a springboard to attack the judge who ruled on the case. The opposite attitude is not only ungrateful but can be categorized as an abuse of rights ---a misuse of rights that undermines the integrity of the legal system.

The political philosophy of Pancasila emphasizes the balance between individual freedom and collective interests. Notonagoro (1975) emphasized that Pancasila embodies the value of harmony, not ego dominance. Within this framework, politicians and public officials must maintain a sense of unity and a mystical sense of national consciousness ---that is, the awareness that individual actions have implications for the sustainability of the nation as a whole.

Mystical national consciousness is a form of awareness that transcends pragmatic political calculations. It demands that leaders and citizens view the nation's interests as a binding "spirit," as embodied in the Volksgeist concept in Friedrich Carl von Savigny's legal theory, that laws and public actions must stem from the soul of the nation (Savigny, 1840/1979). With this awareness, a recipient of abolition who is truly convinced of their innocence should reject the grant and continue their resistance through purely legal channels, in order to maintain their dignity and the authority of the state.

If someone accepts a pardon and then sues the judge, they send a morally ambiguous signal: accepting a pardon seems to acknowledge the legitimacy of the decision, but then rejecting it through a lawsuit. This is not only contradictory from a legal standpoint but also undermines the state's institutional order. At this point, such action can be seen as an affront to the constitution, as it exploits state mechanisms for personal gain without respecting the integrity of inter-institutional functions.

Pancasila democracy differs from liberal-capitalist democracy like that in the United States. In liberal democracy, individualistic politicians can operate based on personal profit-and-loss calculations, as long as they do not violate positive law. However, in Pancasila democracy, political individualism that negates collective consciousness is a form of ideological deviation. Here, politics is not simply a competition for power, but rather a practice of devotion tied to the mystical ideal of independence---"freedom to be united, sovereign, just, and prosperous" (Sukarno, 1960).

For leaders loyal to Pancasila, state pardon is not a loophole to attack opponents, but an opportunity to rebuild public trust. This awareness demands political maturity: either accept the pardon with gratitude, or firmly reject it out of principle and pure self-defense. Both choices are honorable, provided they are consistent; what is dishonorable is accepting pardon while using it as a political weapon of revenge.

As a solution, ethical regulations for state pardon recipients should be considered. These regulations could include norms prohibiting amnesty or abolition recipients from attacking judges based on their decisions, unless there is strong evidence of ethical violations or judicial corruption. The goal is not to restrict citizens' freedoms, but to ensure that the President's prerogative is not used as a tool for inter-institutional conflict.

The application of this principle also strengthens constitutional morality (Bickel, 1962), namely the awareness that political and legal actions must uphold the spirit of the constitution. In the Indonesian context, that spirit is the spirit of mutual cooperation and respect for the integrity of state institutions. Without this awareness, democracy will become trapped in a shallow tactical game, where power becomes an arena for egocentrism, not a vehicle for devotion.

Thus, criticism of abolition recipients who sue judges is not merely a matter of legality, but also a matter of political morality and morality. Such actions reflect a disconnect between personal interests and a mystical sense of nationalism. If you feel you are in the right and innocent, return the abolition and continue the legal fight as a form of devotion to the nation and justice.

Pancasila democracy requires leadership that is not only technocratically astute but also spiritually and politically mature. Such leaders understand that power is not a private right, but rather a trust that must be safeguarded with loyalty to national ideals. Politicians who operate solely on individualistic logic are incompatible with this system, as they will tend to fragment national solidarity for short-term gain.

Loyalty to the mystical ideals of nationalism means placing national unity above ego, the nobility of law above tactical interests, and the honor of the nation above all personal ambitions. In this way, the President's prerogative remains a symbol of wisdom, the judiciary remains steadfast as the guardian of justice, and Pancasila democracy continues to pulsate as the soul of the nation.

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