Critique of Pascal’s Wager : An Excerpt
Critique du Pari de Pascal : Un Extrait
Pascal, les Pensées and le Pari
‘The Wager’ (le pari) is a 17th-century pragmatic view on Christianity, proposed by French mathematician, physicist and philosopher Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). Imbued with scepticism, Pascal has long been compared to Kierkegaard ‘as a leading example of religious conviction based on existential commitment and faith rather than on reason’.[1]
The argument of the Wager itself can be found in a chapter of his chef-d’œuvre, Pensées de M. Pascal sur la religion et sur quelques autres sujets (Pascal’s thoughts on religion and some other subjects), posthumously published in 1670.
No uniformity in the arrangement of the Pensées has been achieved—as evidenced by the many different French and translated versions available today.[2] Therefore, it behoves me to convince myself that the following suffice for this brief essay: the French editon (FP) published by Garnier Frères in 1886 and the English version (EP) translated by A.J. Krailsheimer in 1966.
In FP one can find Pascal’s arguments about the Wager on pages 67–72 under the chapter « Qu’il est plus avantageux de croire que de ne pas croire ce qu’enseigne la religion chrétienne » (that it is more advantageous to believe than not to believe what the Christian religion teaches). The English equivalent can be read in EP on pages 149–152, under the chapter ‘The Wager’.
The objective of Pascal’s Wager
Proving the existence of God is not first and foremost the objective of Pascal’s Wager.[3] Rather, it aims at convincing nonbelievers that the belief in God is the ‘best bet’ (Simon Blackburn, 2008:268). This is testified by the notice to the chapter in the Port-Royal edition (Guillaume Desprez, 1670), which reads:
‘Almost everything that is contained in this chapter is concerned only with some kinds of people who, unconvinced of the evidence of religion—let alone reasons of atheists—remain in a state of suspension between faith and infidelity. The author only claims to show them by their own principles, and by the simple light of reason, that they should judge that it is advantageous to them to believe, and that it would be the stand they should take if this choice depended on their will. Hence it follows that at least until they find the light needed to be convinced of the truth, they must do all that incline them towards it, and free themselves from all hitches that divert them from that faith, which primarily are passions and vain amusements.’
« Presque tout ce qui est contenu dans ce chapitre ne regarde que certaines sortes de personnes qui n’étant pas convaincues des preuves de la Religion, et encore moins des raisons des Athées, demeurent en un état de suspension entre la foi et l’infidélité. L’auteur prétend seulement leur montrer par leurs propres principes, et par les simples lumières de la raison, qu’ils doivent juger qu’il leur est avantageux de croire, et que ce serait le parti qu’ils devraient prendre, si ce choix dépendait de leur volonté. D’où il s’ensuit qu’au moins en attendant qu’ils aient trouvé la lumière nécessaire pour se convaincre de la vérité, ils doivent faire tout ce qui les y peut disposer, et se dégager de tous les empêchements qui les détournent de cette foi, qui sont principalement les passions et les vains amusements. »
The thesis and argumentation of Pascal’s Wager
On the basis of the following quotation one can discover the provocative thesis of Pascal’s Wager.
‘Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved in calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing. Do not hesitate then; wager that he does exist.’ (EP:151)
« Pesons le gain et la perte, en prenant croix, que Dieu est. Estimons ces deux cas : si vous gagnez, vous gagnez tout; si vous perdez, vous ne perdez rien. Gagez donc qu’il est, sans hésiter. »
(FP:69-70)
In other words, the thesis shall be, ‘Wagering that God exists has always been the best choice because one can win everything but can lose nothing’—that is why the heading of this pensée is ‘Infinity – nothing’ (Infini. Rien.).
Pascal deduced the above-mentioned thesis from the following argumentation (cf. EP:149-151, FP:68-69).
1.He drew a distinction between the extension and the limits of (1) the finite, (2) the infinite and (3) God; and explained how these affect the possibility of human rational knowledge of them.
It has...
By reason we know...
Extension
Limits
